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Abstract
We examine the effects of endogenous assignment to incentive contracts on worker pro-
ductivity. Assignment to high performance pay via a market mechanism is roughly twice as
effective as imposing the same contract exogenously. This positive effect is largely offset by
a negative effect for workers that endogenously choose low performance pay. We decompose
the positive effect of endogenous assignment to high performance pay into effects due to
selection and strategic anticipation, and find that selection has a greater effect than strategic
anticipation. We use a Reverse Sort treatment to show that the effect of selection is suffi-
ciently strong to overcome the direct effect of lower performance pay, yielding coordination
at high effort levels in spite of low incentives.
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1 Introduction
The performance of many work groups is constrained by a single weak link. A paper cannot
be completed until all co-authors finish their assigned sections, a meeting cannot start until all
critical personnel are present, and an assembly line moves no faster than its slowest worker. If
pay is based on group performance, as must be the case when only output rather than individual
effort is observed, the strong complementarities generated by a weak-link technology can cause
productivity traps where pessimistic beliefs create a self-fulfilling prophecy: nobody works hard in
the (correct) expectation that any effort will be wasted given that no individual can unilaterally
improve productivity. Escaping such a trap is difficult since coordinated change by all members
of the group is needed to increase productivity.
A number of mechanisms have been proposed to achieve the coordinated increase in effort
needed to escape a productivity trap (defined as coordination at low effort levels). A simple option
that has consistently proven effective is increasing incentives to coordinate at high rather than low
effort. This has been shown to help groups escape productivity traps in lab studies of the weak-link
game (Brandts and Cooper, 2006; Hamman, Rick, and Weber, 2007; Brandts, Cooper, and Weber,
2014) as well as in field settings (Knez and Simester, 2001). The preceding lab studies feature
a common element: assignment of individuals to incentive contracts is random and exogenous.
This was a natural first step for the literature, but in labor markets, where workers frequently
choose between jobs with different incentive contracts, assignment to incentive contracts is often
endogenous. The primary purpose of the experiments presented below is to explore the effect of
having the assignment of individuals to incentive contracts take place endogenously through a
market mechanism.
All of our experiments feature an initial phase in which subjects repeatedly play a weak-link
game under an incentive contract featuring high fixed pay and low incentives to coordinate at high
effort levels (“low performance pay”). This reliably induces a productivity trap. In the second
phase of the experiment, half of the subjects continue with the initial contract and half are as-
signed to a new incentive contract with lower fixed pay and larger incentives to coordinate at high
effort levels (“high performance pay”). Treatments vary by whether the assignment of subjects to
incentive contracts for the second phase is random or endogenous through a market mechanism.
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The positive effect of introducing high performance pay almost doubles with endogenous assign-
ment. However, a matching negative effect from endogenous assignment to low performance pay
largely offsets the positive effect of endogenous assignment to high performance pay. The total
effect of endogenous assignment to incentive contracts, averaging over both contracts, is virtually
zero.
Beyond identifying the effects of endogenous assignment to incentive contracts, a major goal
of our study is to understand why high performance pay is more effective when assigned endoge-
nously. In work environments with the weak-link property, strategic uncertainty makes incentive
contracts “fragile.” Individuals may fail to respond to high performance pay if they fear others
won’t increase effort in response. Endogenous assignment to high performance pay facilitates
coordination at the highest possible effort level (“efficient coordination”) by reducing strategic
uncertainty through two channels, selection and strategic anticipation. “Selection” refers to the
tendency of market mechanisms to assign high performance pay to individuals (“optimists”) who
have inherently optimistic prior beliefs about the chance of coordination at the efficient outcome
independent of how individuals are assigned to groups. Because long-run outcomes in coordination
games are largely driven by initial beliefs (see Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil, 1990 and 1991),
systematic assignment of optimists to high performance pay increases the chance of efficient coor-
dination. Beyond selection, participants can infer that assignment to high performance pay is not
random based on the information available in a market mechanism. “Strategic anticipation” is
the ability of an individual to (correctly) anticipate that optimists are more likely to be assigned
high performance pay by a market mechanism than with random assignment.1 Individuals with
strategic anticipation understand the effects of selection and become more optimistic under high
performance pay when contract assignment is endogenous. This increased optimism improves the
odds of efficient coordination with high performance pay.
We use an innovative “Sort” treatment to measure how much of the positive effect of endoge-
nizing assignment to high performance pay is due to selection rather than strategic anticipation.
In this treatment, subjects’ characteristics and initial choices are used to predict which incentive
contract they would have been assigned by the market mechanism. We then exogenously imple-
1This is related to forward induction, as both rely on individuals understanding that past choices reveal infor-
mation about others’ beliefs, but is not based on iterated removal of dominated strategies (Ben-Porath and Dekel,
1992).
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ment the predicted contract assignments to imperfectly reproduce the market’s outcome. The Sort
treatment preserves the effects of selection as it inherits the market’s tendency to assign optimists
to high performance pay, but eliminates the effects of strategic anticipation by depriving subjects
of any information that allows them to anticipate the selection process. We find that selection
plays a larger role than strategic anticipation in increasing efficient coordination with endogenous
assignment to high performance pay.
The effect of selection is so strong that it can overcome the direct effect of lower incentives to
coordinate at high effort levels. We demonstrate this through a “Reverse Sort” treatment that
flips the contract assignments from the Sort treatment, switching the sign of the selection effect.
This results in higher effort levels with low performance pay than high performance pay!
Our work contributes to two strands of the existing literature. Both lab and field studies
have examined how endogenous choice of performance pay schemes (e.g. piece-rate systems)
affects performance in individual tasks. These studies generally find that such schemes improve
productivity and that the majority of this positive effect is due to selection of more able individuals
(i.e. Lazear, 2000; Cadsby, Song, and Tapon, 2007; Eriksson and Villeval, 2008; Dohmen and
Falk, 2011; Bandiera, Guiso, Prat, and Sadun, 2015). Our work has similar findings – endogenous
choice of high performance pay improves productivity with selection accounting for most of the
effect – but differs from the existing literature because of the critical role played by strategic
uncertainty. Selection is based on individuals’ beliefs rather than their ability to perform a task.
The market mechanism assigns those who are inherently optimistic about the likelihood of efficient
coordination to groups with high performance pay. Group productivity in field settings generally
does not just depend on skill, but also depends on being able to work together. It makes sense
that selection takes place along the latter dimension as well as the former.
Our experiments also relate to the literature on buying the right to play a coordination game,
notably Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1993). Van Huyck et al. study repeated play of a two-
stage game where players bid for the right to play a median game. They find that winning bids
converge to the payoff from the efficient equilibrium and winning subjects’ play in the median
game converges to the efficient equilibrium. Van Huyck et al. attribute the latter result to
forward induction, while Crawford and Broseta (1998) argue that it reflects an interaction between
learning, forward induction, and an optimistic subject effect analogous to selection. Our result that
endogenous assignment to high performance pay improves the likelihood of efficient coordination
3
is obviously related, but we reach different conclusions about the source of this effect. Using the
Sort treatment, we show that the effect of endogenizing contract assignment is primarily due to
selection rather than strategic anticipation (taking the place of forward induction). This has an
important implication for the interpretation of our results. Selection effects do not rely on workers
understanding the selection process, and hence are more likely to carry over to field settings.
A feature that differentiates our experiments from the existing literature is that the outside
option for individuals who are not assigned high performance pay by the auction is continued play
with low performance pay contracts. For experiments with endogenous assignment to performance
pay, the outside option is typically either a flat payment or individual work under pre-existing
incentives (usually flat-rate pay). The same forces of selection and strategic anticipation that push
groups assigned high performance pay towards efficient coordination also lead groups assigned
low performance pay to coordinate at inefficient outcomes. The negative effect of endogenous
assignment to low performance pay offsets the positive effect of endogenous assignment to high
performance pay, making the total effect of endogenous assignment neutral. This counterbalancing
effect cannot occur with a fixed outside option.
The preceding implies a link between the total effect of endogenous assignment to incentive
contracts and labor mobility. Our experiments model a “closed” labor market, meaning that
workers can easily move between firms within the market, but cannot easily enter and exit the
market. High performance pay works in large part by attracting optimists to a firm. In a closed
market, those optimists must come from other firms within the industry, causing a negative
externality. Contrast this with an “open” market where workers can easily move into and out
of the market. Optimists can move into the market and pessimists can move out in response to
changing incentive contracts, reducing the negative externality caused by a firm adopting high
performance pay. We conjecture that many labor markets are closed in the short run and open in
the long run.2 This suggests that the total effect of endogenous assignment to high performance
pay becomes more positive over time. More broadly, our results illustrate the importance of
considering what happens to individuals who do not select into high performance pay as well as
what happens to those who do.
2For example, consider a market containing jobs that require a large amount of specialized training. In the
short run it is hard to train new workers, and those who leave the market sacrifice the value of their specialized
skills. In the long run more workers can be trained and brought into the market.
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We study a simple environment with a single mechanism for improving productivity – high
performance pay. This is not meant to dismiss the importance of other mechanisms that have
been studied as tools for overcoming productivity traps. Given that escaping a productivity trap is
non-trivial, it presumably makes sense to use more than one instrument. We show that increased
performance pay is a more powerful instrument than previous experiments indicate.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes related research. Section 3 lays out
the experimental design, procedures, and hypotheses. Section 4 presents the main results of the
paper. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Since the seminal work of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990), it has been well known that
achieving efficient coordination in weak-link games is unlikely when the number of players is large
and no mechanism exists for promoting efficient coordination. Using performance pay to increase
incentives for efficient coordination has proven a reliable method of escaping productivity traps.
Many other mechanisms intended to promote efficient coordination have also been shown to be
effective. These include costless pre-play communication (Cooper, De Jong, Forsythe, and Ross,
1992; Duffy and Feltovich, 2002; Duffy and Feltovich, 2006; Blume and Ortmann, 2007; Brandts
and Cooper, 2007; Cason, Sheremeta, and Zhang, 2012; Brandts, Cooper, and Weber, 2014),
inter-generational advice (Chaudhuri, Schotter, and Sopher, 2009), competition between groups
(Bornstein, Gneezy, and Nagel, 2002; Myung, 2012), gradual growth of groups (Weber, 2006),
help with commitment (Brandts, Cooper, Fatas, and Qi, 2016), and endogenous group formation
(Riedl, Rohde, and Strobel, 2016; Salmon and Weber, 2017).
The experiments described below feature a market mechanism that assigns subjects endoge-
nously to different incentive contracts. A similar mechanism is used by Van Huyck, Battalio,
and Beil (1993), the first paper to show that paying for the right to play a coordination game
leads to efficient coordination. In Van Huyck et al., subjects play in fixed groups of 18. The
treatment of interest has a two-stage game in each round. In the first stage, subjects bid in an
English clock auction for the right to play a nine-player median game (Van Huyck, Battalio, and
Beil (1991)). The nine winners play the median game in the second stage. Within a few rounds,
play in the median game reliably converges to the efficient equilibrium. Median games are not
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as challenging an environment as weak-link games, but it is nevertheless highly unlikely that the
efficient equilibrium would emerge spontaneously. Van Huyck et al. attribute the positive effect
of the auctions to forward induction. Later papers (Broseta, Fatas, and Neugebauer, 2003 and
Sherstyuk, Karmanskaya, and Teslia, 2014) report similar results.3
Our work differs from Van Huyck et al. along a number of dimensions. The most important
is that our experiments are designed to disentangle why endogenous assignment to groups via a
market mechanism increases efficient coordination. We show that strategic anticipation, a closely
related concept to forward induction, explains little of the effect. Another important difference
is that subjects who don’t win the auction still participate in a coordination game. This lets us
measure the total effect of endogenous assignment to incentive contracts.
Crawford and Broseta (1998) develop a structural model to study the learning process in
Van Huyck et al. This is different from the learning process in our experiments, because the
Van Huyck et al. design features many auctions rather than one, leading to a feedback loop
between the auctions and the coordination game. Forward induction and selection of optimistic
subjects increase the effort chosen by auction winners. This causes higher future bids as subjects’
expectations about the outcome of the coordination game become more optimistic. Crawford and
Broseta attribute the efficient coordination outcome mainly to two major components, forward
induction and a combination of an “optimistic subjects” effect and a “robustness” effect. The
optimistic subjects effect captures the tendency of subjects who are optimistic ex ante about
the outcome of the coordination game to win the auction, and the robustness effect captures the
interaction between learning and strategic uncertainty. Crawford and Broseta estimate the impacts
of forward induction, the optimistic subjects effect, and the robustness effect by fitting their model
to the data and then running simulations. They attribute roughly half of the improvement with
auctions to forward induction and half to the combination of the optimistic subjects and robustness
effects. For technical reasons it is not possible to separate the latter two effects. As previously
mentioned, our experimental design lets us directly measure the effects of selection (similar to the
optimistic subjects effect) and strategic anticipation (in lieu of forward induction). Our results
place relatively low weight on strategic anticipation.
Cachon and Camerer (1996) argue that loss aversion plays a major role in the Van Huyck et
3Kogan, Kwasnica, and Weber (2011) show that incorporating futures markets harms efficiency in the coordi-
nation game, with the effect coming through beliefs rather than direct incentive effects.
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al. results. Our design does not have “pay to play,” limiting the role of loss aversion. As such,
our results do not speak to the issues they raise.
The market mechanism in our paper sorts individuals by their beliefs about the likelihood of
efficient coordination rather than their abilities to perform certain tasks. Kosfeld and von Siemens
(2009, 2011) present a related theoretical model that predicts sorting into or out of workplaces
based on being a conditional cooperator. Their theory involves strategic uncertainty, as conditional
cooperators would like to be matched with other conditional cooperators, as well as sorting via
monetary incentives.
Endogenous group assignment and strategic uncertainty are important features of our experi-
mental environment. For the most part, strategic uncertainty and group interactions do not play
much of a role in the literature on endogenous choice of incentive contracts. One exception is
Dohmen and Falk (2011) who consider interactive settings (revenue sharing and tournaments)
as well as piece-rate compensation. Strategic uncertainty and beliefs play a role in their results,
albeit differently from our experiments, as self-assessment of relative ability has a significant effect
on selection into tournaments.
Endogenous group assignment and strategic uncertainty also play an important role in the
literature on endogenous assignment to groups and VCMs. Endogenous assignment to groups has
been shown to generally increase contributions to public goods (e.g. Kosfeld, Okada, and Riedl,
2009; Brekke, Hauge, Lind, and Nyborg, 2011; Charness, Cobo-Reyes, and Jime´nez, 2011; Aimone,
Iannaccone, Makowsky, and Rubin, 2013). Our work is related to this literature, but differs along
several dimensions: (1) weak-link games raise different strategic issues than VCM games, (2) group
assignment occurs via pricing within a market mechanism (rather than direct choice of groups),
and (3) we focus on the relative importance of selection and strategic anticipation in determining
the effect of endogenous assignment to incentive contracts.4
The results of our Sort treatment are related to earlier papers studying VCM public goods
games. Specifically, Gunnthorsdottir, Houser, and McCabe (2007) find that a subject’s initial
public contribution is a useful measure of cooperative disposition (independent from any history
effects), and Ones and Putterman (2007) show that the initial cooperative or non-cooperative
4Related papers showing effects of endogenous assignment to groups, roles, or institutions include Bohnet and
Ku¨bler (2005); Cabrales, Miniaci, Piovesan, and Ponti (2010); Dal Bo´, Foster, and Putterman (2010); and Lazear,
Malmendier, and Weber (2012).
7
tendencies that group members bring to a collective action situation have a persistent effect on
cooperation. Similar to our Sort treatment, these papers use initial behavior to assign individuals
to groups and show that there is a persistent long-run effect consistent with subjects having an
innate type.
3 Experimental Design
3.1 The Corporate Turnaround Game: The turnaround game (Brandts and Cooper, 2006)
is designed to study how a group caught in a productivity trap can escape (i.e. coordinate at a
higher effort level). We use a variation of the turnaround game from Brandts and Cooper consisting
of twenty rounds of a weak-link coordination game, split into two ten-round blocks. Subjects play
in groups of four experimental subjects. They are randomly assigned to a group for the first
ten-round block, and then are assigned to a new group for the final ten rounds. The method of
assigning subjects to new groups for the final block varies by treatment as explained below.
The structure of the turnaround game played follows from three basic design choices. First,
the firm’s technology has a weak-link structure. As described by Kremer (1993), for many orga-
nizations the individual (or unit) doing the worst job – the “weak link” – determines the overall
productivity of an organization. Imposing a weak-link structure creates a worst-case scenario for
escaping a productivity trap since a unanimous increase in effort is necessary to improve group
output. Presumably, many organizations face more forgiving environments where positive change
is easier, but if we can understand how to escape productivity traps in tough environments, our
insights should carry over to less difficult circumstances.
Second, we assume the firm can observe group output, equivalent to observing minimum effort
in the absence of noise, but cannot observe any individual employee’s effort level. It therefore
cannot implement an incentive system based on individual effort rather than group output. Making
individual effort unobservable simplifies the environment while increasing the difficulty of escaping
a productivity trap.
Finally, the only instrument used to help escape a productivity trap is a simple linear incentive
contract. We have eliminated more complex contracts as well as other instruments, such as
communication, that have previously been shown to yield an increase in efficient coordination (see
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Footnote 1 for relevant citations). Our goal is to study a simple environment that isolates the
effect of incentive contracts, while also increasing the difficulty of escaping a productivity trap.
In all likelihood, organizations facing a productivity traps will employ more than one method for
escaping, and a topic for future research is how the various instruments interact.
At the beginning of each ten-round block, an incentive contract is announced for the group.
This contract specifies a subject’s compensation in experimental currency units (ECUs) as a
function of the minimum effort across the four subjects in the group. A contract consists of a flat
base wage (W ) that each subject receives regardless of the outcome of the game and a bonus rate
(B) that determines the amount of additional pay each subject receives per unit increase in the
minimum effort. Higher values of B provide greater incentives to coordinate at high effort levels.
The incentive system in our experiment is a linear revenue sharing scheme. Straightforward
revenue sharing systems are common in practice and well-suited to our experimental design for
a couple of reasons: (1) This is a very simple incentive system. Subjects can easily understand
how the incentives work as well as the implications of their assignment to an incentive contract.
(2) There is an obvious link between the resolution of strategic uncertainty and workers’ choices
between incentive contracts. Workers should be willing to accept lower fixed wages in exchange
for a higher value of B if and only if they believe that higher values of B are associated with a
higher probability of coordination at high effort levels. This link is central to our experimental
design.
In each round, the subjects simultaneously choose effort levels, where Ei is the effort level
chosen by the ith subject (i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}). Effort choices are restricted to be in ten-unit increments:
Ei ∈ {0, 10, 20, 30, 40}. To make effort costly, payoffs are reduced by 5 ECUs per unit of effort
expended. The payoff πi for subject i is given by the following equation:
πi = W − 5Ei + (B × min
j∈{1,2,3,4}
{Ej}).
If B > 5, as is always the case in our experiments, the resulting stage game is a weak-link
coordination game. Coordination by all four subjects on any of the five available effort levels is a
Nash equilibrium. The five equilibria are Pareto ranked. The most desirable equilibrium involves
coordination at the highest possible effort (i.e. efficient coordination).
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Two different types of contracts are used in our experiment. Contract 1 always offers W = 300
and B = 6. The payoff matrix in the top panel of Table 1 results from Contract 1. Contract 2
increases the bonus rate from B = 6 to B = 10. Thus, Contract 2 features higher incentives to
coordinate at high effort levels than Contract 1. The precise manner in which W is determined
for Contract 2 is treatment dependent as explained in Section 3.2. For a given base wage W , the
payoff matrix resulting from Contract 2 is shown in the bottom panel of Table 1.
Table 1: Payoff Matrices by Contract
Contract 1
Minimum Efforts
by Subjects of the Group
0 10 20 30 40
E
ff
or
t
b
y
S
u
b
je
ct
i
0 300 - - - -
10 250 310 - - -
20 200 260 320 - -
30 150 210 270 330 -
40 100 160 220 280 340
Contract 2
Minimum Efforts
by Subjects of the Group
0 10 20 30 40
E
ff
or
t
b
y
S
u
b
je
ct
i
0 W - - - -
10 W − 50 W + 50 - - -
20 W − 100 W W + 100 - -
30 W − 150 W − 50 W + 50 W + 150 -
40 W − 200 W − 100 W W + 100 W + 200
Notes: Contract 1 offers a base wage W = 300 and a bonus factor B = 6. For Contract 2, W is the base
wage determined by the Auction, and the bonus factor is B = 10. When the base wage W ∈ (140, 300),
the payoff from coordinating at 0 is always higher in Contract 1 and the payoff from coordinating at 40
is always higher in Contract 2.
Contract 1 features low incentives for coordination at a high effort level. Subjects receive a
riskless payoff of 300 ECUs by choosing 0. Attempting to coordinate at higher effort levels is risky
with little potential upside. For simplicity, assume that all subjects choose either 0 or 40. Relative
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to a choice of 0, increasing effort to 40 incurs a sunk effort cost of 200 ECUs in exchange for a
potential net gain of only 40 ECUs. For this to have positive expected value, the probability of
all of the three other group members choosing 40 must be greater than 5/6.
Contract 2 offers higher incentives to take the risk of trying to coordinate at a higher effort
level. Consider again the situation facing a subject choosing between 0 and 40. Relative to a
choice of 0, choosing 40 still incurs a sunk effort cost of 200 ECUs, but the potential net gain is
increased to 200 ECUs. The probability of all of the other group members choosing effort level
40 only needs to be 1/2 for choosing 40 to yield higher expected payoff than choosing 0.
We did not restrict a priori the base wage of Contract 2 to be in the range of 140 < W < 300,
but the realized values were always within this range. These two conditions imply that the payoff
from coordinating at 0 was always higher in Contract 1 than in Contract 2 and the payoff from
coordinating at 40 was always higher in Contract 2 than in Contract 1.
3.2 Design and Treatments: We began all sessions by gathering measures of individual
characteristics. We used the method of Eckel and Grossman (2008) to measure risk attitudes (see
Appendix B for a full description).
Subjects were also asked to complete a questionnaire collecting information on their cogni-
tive and demographic characteristics. As a measure of intelligence, we used self-reported SAT
scores (mathematics and comprehensive).5 The SAT is the primary college entry exam in the
United States. There is high correlation between SAT scores and IQ scores (Frey and Detterman,
2004). We measured a subject’s personality traits using a brief version of the Big-Five Personality
Test provided in Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann (2003). Survey questions from Glaeser, Laibson,
Scheinkman, and Soutter (2000) were used to measure how trusting/trustworthy a subject was.
We also gathered basic demographics (age, gender, race, and major).
Because beliefs play a critical role in coordination games, we considered eliciting beliefs prior
to Blocks 1 and 2. We chose not to do so due to the risk of demand-induced effects. Forcing
subjects to think about others’ future actions could have stimulated more sophisticated reasoning
including strategic anticipation.
5 Some subjects had not taken the SAT, but had ACT scores. For those subjects, we converted their score
using the SAT-ACT Concordance Chart provided on http://www.collegeboard.org. Reflecting local IRB policies,
subjects were given the option of skipping questions to protect their privacy. There were few missing values for
other questions, but a substantial fraction of the subjects (31%) chose not to report an SAT/ACT score. We
discuss below how the analysis reflects these missing values.
11
After all of the individual measures were gathered, subjects played Block 1 (Rounds 1 – 10) of
the turnaround game. Subjects were randomly assigned to groups of four, which remained fixed
for the block. All subjects in all sessions were assigned to Contract 1 in Block 1. Given the weak
incentives to raise effort above 0, we anticipated that play would converge to low effort levels.
The goal was to generate a productivity trap that subjects would need to escape from in Block 2.
Achieving efficient coordination in a weak-link game is a challenging task, and having to overcome
a history of low effort makes it even harder.
Prior to the start of Block 2 (Rounds 11 – 20) of the turnaround game, subjects were assigned
to either Contract 1 or Contract 2, new groups were formed with subjects assigned to the same
contract, and W was set for Contract 2. Only one version of Contract 2 was used in any session,
and the number of subjects in each session was a multiple of eight, so an equal number of groups
could be assigned to each contract. The four treatments varied how contract assignment was done.
In the Auction treatment, the subjects’ assignment to contracts and the base wage W of
Contract 2 was based on a reverse English auction, to be explained below.6 While auctions
are used in many real-world markets, including some labor markets, they are not an especially
common market mechanism for labor markets.7 Nevertheless, clock auctions have a number of
advantages for our experiments. They are easy to implement in a lab setting, quickly equilibrate,
and make the selection process transparent for subjects (giving strategic anticipation a better
chance of having an effect). In a broader sense, the auction has two critical features: workers
must sacrifice fixed wages (W ) to obtain higher performance pay (B) and workers are aware that
they and others make a choice whether or not to accept lower fixed wages in exchange for higher
performance pay. Any reasonable mechanism for a labor market should share these features, so
our qualitative conclusions should not strongly depend on our choice of a market mechanism.
At the beginning of the auction, W was set to 400 ECUs with 400 seconds on the clock. The
clock then ticked down towards zero. The base wage was reduced by 5 ECUs every five seconds
(400, 395, 390, etc.). We used discrete changes to give subjects time to react before W dropped
6This clock auction is strategically equivalent to a sealed bid uniform price auction and shares the property of
having a dominant strategy (bid or drop out at your reservation value). Experimental evidence (Kagel and Levin,
1993) shows that subjects tend to use the dominant strategy in English auctions but not in the equivalent Vickrey
auction. This implies that the clock auction is less prone to mispricing than the sealed bid auction.
7A number of online labor markets use auctions to set wages. An example is http://www.freelancer.com, the
largest outsourcing marketplace with 15.6 million freelancers and almost 8 million projects posted. An employer
posts a project and freelancers make bids. The employer decides on a freelancer based on the price and ratings.
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again. At any given time, subjects could press a button labeled “Contract 1.” As soon as a subject
clicked on this button, he/she was immediately assigned to Contract 1. If there were N subjects
in the session, the auction continued until N/2 subjects had dropped out by pressing the Contract
1 button. The remaining N/2 subjects were assigned to Contract 2 with the value of W based on
the time at which the last dropout took place. Subjects saw the payoff tables under Contracts 1
and 2 throughout the auction, with the Contract 2 table adjusting to reflect changing values of W .
At no point during or after the auction were subjects given any information about dropouts prior
to the final dropout. After the auction was completed, subjects assigned to Contract 2 only knew
the value of W at which the final dropout took place. Once subjects were assigned to contracts,
they were randomly placed into four-person groups with others assigned to the same contract.
Depending on the show-up rate of subjects, we had either 16 or 24 subjects in each session of
the Auction treatment. The realized base wages of Contract 2 are summarized in Table 2, broken
down by session size.
Table 2: Realized Base Wages in Contract 2
16-Subject Sessions 24-Subject Sessions
Base Wages (in ECUs) 180, 210 190, 195, 225, 235
Prior to the auction, our detailed instructions stressed the relationship betweenW and the pay-
off table for Contract 2 and provided comparisons between the payoff tables of the two contracts.
The goal was to have subjects understand the relationship between dropping out or not and their
payoff table for Block 2. Subjects also watched a short movie demonstrating how the auction
mechanism worked and participated in an unpaid practice round played against computerized
opponents with randomly determined dropout times.8
In Block 2 of the Auction treatment, we attribute differences in behavior between Contracts 1
and 2 to the following three sources.
1). Direct Incentive Effect: Subjects have higher incentives to coordinate at the efficient outcome
under Contract 2 than Contract 1.
8Dropout times were distributed uniformly over the range [0, 400]. Subjects knew that the dropouts in the
practice round were randomly determined and contained no useful information.
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2). Selection Effect: Subjects assigned to Contract 2 by the auction may have inherently different
characteristics than those assigned to Contract 1. Selection can occur along many dimensions
(e.g. risk preferences, personality traits) but initial beliefs are particularly germane given the
importance of beliefs in coordination games. Contract 2 is relatively attractive to “optimists”,
defined as subjects who are optimistic about the chance of efficient coordination independent
of the auction outcome, implying that optimists are relatively more willing to accept a lower
base wage in order to obtain Contract 2. It follows that the auction tends to sort optimists
into Contract 2 and pessimists (defined as subjects who are pessimistic about the chance of
efficient coordination independent of the auction outcome) into Contract 1.
3). Effect of Strategic Anticipation: Subjects who anticipate that individuals assigned to Contract
2 by the auction are likely to be optimists become more optimistic when assigned to Contract
2 by the auction and more pessimistic when assigned to Contract 1. This optimism/pessimism
depends on the auction outcome, because an otherwise identical individual with strategic an-
ticipation will have different beliefs depending on which contract they are assigned by the
auction. Strategic anticipation can only have an effect when subjects are given information
that makes it possible to anticipate selection due to the auction.
In the Random Assignment treatment, subjects were randomly assigned to new groups for
Block 2. The groups were then randomly assigned to either Contract 1 or Contract 2, with a 50/50
split between contracts imposed in each session. To maintain parallelism between the Auction and
Random Assignment treatments, we matched the session sizes and base wages of Contract 2 in
the Random Assignment sessions to those used in the Auction treatment sessions.
The instructions gave subjects no indication there was anything systematic about how groups
or contracts were assigned. Subjects were told that the groups had changed, and the instructions
stressed that they were almost certainly not with the same people as in Block 1. As for the
contract, subjects were told, “You will be assigned to a new contract in Block 2. This may be
a different contract than the one you had in Block 1, or it may be the same.” Subjects had no
reason to believe that their contract assignment told them anything about the type of people in
their group. Thus, selection cannot be present in the Random Assignment treatment. Differences
between Contracts 1 and 2 in the Random Assignment treatment can be attributed solely to the
direct incentive effect.
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Differences between the Random Assignment and Auction treatments capture the difference
between exogenous and endogenous assignment to contracts. The Sort treatment separates this
difference into selection and strategic anticipation effects by assigning subjects to contracts through
a mechanism designed to mimic (imperfectly) the selection occurring in the Auction treatment.
Specifically, we used data from the Auction treatment to generate a model predicting each subject’s
dropout time as a function of his/her individual characteristics and his/her choice in Round 1 of
Block 1. Specifics of this model are given below in Section 3.4. After Block 1, subjects in the Sort
treatment were ranked from the highest to the lowest predicted dropout time. The clock in the
auction showed the time remaining, so subjects with high dropout times dropped out and took
Contract 1 while those with low dropout times stayed in and were assigned to Contract 2. In the
Sort treatment, subjects ranked first, second, third and fourth were assigned to Group 1, subjects
ranked fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth were assigned to Group 2, and so on. Groups 1, 2, and
3 were assigned to Contract 1 (Groups 1 and 2 for sessions with only 16 subjects) and Groups
4, 5, and 6 were assigned to Contract 2 (Groups 3 and 4 for sessions with only 16 subjects). In
other words, subjects who were predicted to have chosen Contract 1 if they had participated in
the Auction treatment were assigned to Contract 1 in the Sort treatment, and subjects who were
predicted to have chosen Contract 2 in the Auction treatment were assigned to Contract 2.9
Subjects in the Sort treatment received the same information as subjects in the Random
Assignment treatment about how groups and contracts were assigned. This information was
intentionally vague, giving subjects no indication that there was anything systematic about how
groups or contracts were assigned. The goal was to mimic (imperfectly) the selection present in
the Auction treatment while disabling strategic anticipation. The difference between the Sort and
Random Assignment treatment provides a lower bound on the size of the selection effect.10
The Auction and Sort treatments use different methods of assigning subjects to groups condi-
tional on their assigned contract. By sorting subjects into groups within contracts, we can use the
differences between groups within contracts as an additional measure of the impact of selection on
9See Rietz, Sheremeta, Shields, and Smith (2013) for an example of using an initial phase to type individuals.
Rietz et al. use this typing exercise to help understand individual behavior in a repeated three-player trust game.
10Dal Bo´, Foster, and Putterman (2010) faced a similar methodological challenge of separating selection effects
from other effects of endogenous assignment in their study of the effects of democracy. We could have used a similar
mechanism to separate selection effects from the effects of strategic anticipation, but this would have had major
drawbacks in our experiment. The largest problem is that their method would have caused an enormous loss of
power given the structure of our experiment, necessitating a vastly larger sample size. For a detailed discussion of
this issue, see Appendix A.
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Block 2 of the Sort treatment. It is not possible to do a similar sorting for the Auction treatment
as we do not observe dropout times for half of the subjects, but we feel the additional measure is
worth a departure from parallelism.11
The Reverse Sort treatment is designed to illustrate the power of selection. This treatment
was identical to the Sort treatment, except subjects were assigned to the contract they were not
predicted to be assigned in the Auction treatment. In other words, subjects predicted to be
assigned Contract 1 in the Auction treatment were assigned to Contract 2 in the Reverse Sort
treatment and subjects who were predicted to be assigned Contract 2 in the Auction treatment
were assigned to Contract 1 in the Reverse Sort treatment. Within contracts, subjects were
sorted into groups by their predicted dropout times. Strategic anticipation should play no role
in the Reverse Sort treatment, and the selection effect should increase effort for Contract 1 and
reduce effort for Contract 2. Since the selection effect counteracts the direct incentive effect, the
difference between Contracts 1 and 2 is expected to be narrowed in Block 2 relative to the Random
Assignment treatment, or possibly even reversed.
3.3 Procedures: All experimental sessions were conducted in the XS/FS computer lab of
Florida State University using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). All FSU undergraduates
were eligible to participate, although subjects were drawn primarily from students taking social
science classes (economics, political science, and sociology). Subjects’ recruitment was done using
the software ORSEE (Greiner, 2015), and subjects were allowed to participate in only one session.
Subjects were guaranteed $10 for arriving on time. Average earnings per participant were $17.32
including the show-up fee, and sessions typically lasted 45 – 60 minutes. Each treatment had six
sessions and 128 subjects (two sessions with 16 subjects and four with 24 subjects).
At the beginning of each session, subjects were randomly seated. Instructions (see Appendix
B) were read aloud by the experimenter prior to each stage of the experiment, and subjects were
given a short comprehension quiz.
At the beginning of each round, subjects were shown the base wage, the bonus rate, and the
resulting payoff matrix. It was common knowledge that all subjects of a given group faced the
same contract, and that the group and contract were fixed throughout the ten-round block. While
11In a companion paper (Cooper, Ioannou, and Qi, 2018), we use a structural model to study the effect of the
assignment method (random or sorted within contract). Simulation exercises indicate that the assignment method
has little effect on our results (average effort by contract).
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viewing this information, subjects were asked to pick an effort level for the round. These choices
were made simultaneously, so subjects did not know the effort choices of the others in their group
before making their own choices. After all group members had made decisions, subjects were
shown a summary of the round’s results including the minimum effort, their payoff for the round,
and their cumulative earnings. They were also shown, sorted from low to high, the effort levels
that all the subjects of the group had chosen. Subjects were provided with a summary of results
from the previous rounds of the block.
At the end of the session, each subject was paid via check the earnings for all rounds played
plus the $10 show-up fee. Payment was done on an individual and private basis.
3.4 Predicting Dropout Times: The Sort and Reverse Sort treatments required us to predict
when subjects would have dropped out of the auction if they had been in the Auction treatment.
This was done in two steps. First, we ran a regression, fitting the times subjects dropped out
(i.e. pressed the “Contract 1” button) in the Auction treatment as a function of their individual
characteristics and their first choice in the turnaround game (i.e. before they interacted with other
subjects). A Tobit model was used due to censoring of dropout times. Technical details of the
model are given in Appendix A. In the second step, the fitted parameters for this Tobit model were
used to generate predicted dropout times for subjects in the Sort and Reverse Sort treatments.
After the first round of play in the turnaround game (Block 1) was completed, a research assistant
entered data into a program that generated predictions, and subjects were sorted into groups for
Block 2 using these predicted dropout times. Each stage of the experiment used a separate z-Tree
program, so an experimenter could enter information about groupings into the Block 2 program
while Block 1 was running. The data entry and calculations were sufficiently rapid that subjects
observed no delays prior to the start of Block 2.12
12This was the main reason for not including the Round 10 choice in the Tobit model. Waiting until the end of
Block 1 to start entering information would have caused a long delay before the beginning of Block 2. If the Round
10 choice is added to the Tobit model along with the Round 1 choice, then both variables are statistically significant
but the ability to predict which contract a subject is assigned only improves slightly. A secondary concern was
that endogeneity of the Round 10 choice could bias our estimates.
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Table 3: Tobit Regression Independent Variables
Variables Explanation Data Source
RISK Choice of option in the Risk Aversion Test Risk Aversion Test
MATH SAT Math Score if reported Questionnaire
IMATH Indicator function: “=1” if Math Score reported & “=0” otherwise Questionnaire
SCORE SAT Comprehensive Score if reported Questionnaire
ISCORE Indicator function: “=1” if Comp. Score reported & “=0” otherwise Questionnaire
EXTROV ERT Big 5 Personality Test: Extroversion Questionnaire
AGREEABLE Big 5 Personality Test: Agreeableness Questionnaire
CONSCIENTIOUS Big 5 Personality Test: Conscientiousness Questionnaire
EMOTIONSTABLE Big 5 Personality Test: Emotional Stability Questionnaire
OPENNESS Big 5 Personality Test: Openness Questionnaire
FAIR Trust Test: “Would most people try to be fair?” Questionnaire
HELP Trust Test: “Would most people try to be helpful?” Questionnaire
TRUST Trust Test: “Can most people be trusted?” Questionnaire
TRANSFER Trust Test: “Should personal income be determined by work?” Questionnaire
STRANGER Trust Test: “Can you count on strangers?” Questionnaire
TRUSTME Trust Test: “Am I trustworthy?” Questionnaire
EFFORTl Effort Choice Dummies in round 1 of Block 1 & l ∈ {10, 20, 30, 40} Block 1
CONS Constant
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Table 4: Regression Models to Predict Dropout Times
Model 1 Model 2
Dependant Dropout Probability of
Variable Times Choosing 40
RISK 2.802 0.055
(4.779) (0.075)
MATH 0.147 0.008∗∗∗
(0.167) (0.003)
IMATH −30.279∗ 0.253
(16.972) (0.303)
SCORE 0.041 −0.002∗
(0.051) (0.001)
ISCORE −5.000 −0.038
(19.168) (0.326)
EXTROV ERT −13.668∗ −0.212∗
(7.469) (0.112)
AGREEABLE 4.210 −0.084
(7.050) (0.098)
CONSCIENTIOUS −6.422 0.067
(8.099) (0.117)
EMOTIONSTABLE 1.315 0.097
(8.224) (0.114)
OPENNESS −1.718 0.036
(8.023) (0.114)
FAIR −10.029 −0.252∗
(9.034) (0.140)
HELP 6.356 0.178
(8.241) (0.142)
TRUST −12.462 0.092
(8.499) (0.143)
TRANSFER −6.977 0.101
(9.509) (0.155)
STRANGER −2.737 0.040
(9.765) (0.164)
TRUSTME 18.686 −0.095
(12.067) (0.145)
EFFORT10 −18.824
(35.701)
EFFORT20 −23.875
(30.918)
EFFORT30 −24.710
(28.812)
EFFORT40 −101.631∗∗∗
(27.084)
CONS 141.473 −2.435
(135.634) (1.897)
# of Observations 128 128
Notes: Model 1 uses a Tobit regression to predict dropout times in the Auction Treatment. Model 2
uses a probit model to predict the probability of choosing effort 40 in the 1st round of Block 1. Standard
errors are given in parentheses. Three (***), two (**), and one (*) stars indicate statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Table 4 reports the results of two regressions, with Table 3 providing a brief description of the
independent variables. Model 1 gives the results of the Tobit regression used to predict dropout
times. By far the most important variable is the dummy for choice of effort level 40 in the
first round of the turnaround game. The parameter estimate is large and significant at the 1%
level. Consistent with the Tobit results, subjects who chose 40 in the first round were more than
twice as likely to be assigned to Contract 2 versus Contract 1 (69% vs. 31%). The extroversion
component of the Big Five and the dummy variable for subjects who reported a math score also
have significant effects, but only at the 10% level.13
The measures gathered prior to Block 1 have little predictive power in Model 1 for dropout
times. One possible explanation is that these measures act on dropout times through their effect
on the probability of choosing 40 in the first round. Model 2 supports this argument. This is a
Probit model where the dependent variable is the dummy for choice of 40 in the first round of
Block 1 and the independent variables are the individual measures gathered before Block 1. There
is a strong positive relationship between math scores and choosing 40, and a number of the other
measures also have weakly significant relationships with the likelihood of choosing 40. Somewhat
to our surprise, risk aversion has minimal effect in Models 1 and 2. There is no indication that
the auction sorts individuals based on their risk preferences.14 A number of the survey questions
measure subjects’ social preferences, particularly whether they are trusting and/or trustworthy.
These measures have little impact on the likelihood of initially choosing 40, but it is possible that
incentivized measures or measures designed to measure different attributes such as altruism would
have yielded stronger results.
To check how well the model replicates contract assignment by the auction, we compared the
contract assignments predicted by the Tobit model with the actual contract assignments in the
Auction treatment. The model correctly predicts the contract assignment for 69% of the subjects
(88/128). Among subjects for whom our model incorrectly predicts the contract assignments,
most are close to indifferent with 65% having predicted dropout times within 30 seconds of the
13As noted previously, about a third of subjects chose not to report scores. The regressions include a dummy
for subjects who did report a score as well as a slope parameter. The missing scores were set equal to the median
reported score. Subjects who did not report a math score were less likely to be assigned to Contract 2 in the
Auction treatment (36% vs. 58%).
14We anticipated that subjects who were risk averse would avoid strategic risk by making low initial effort choices,
but find no evidence to support this conjecture. This could be because our subjects are largely risk neutral given
the low stakes involved, or because the relevant risk preferences are domain specific and not captured by the Eckel
and Grossman measure that we employ.
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cutoff to switch to the other (correct) contract. As an alternative method of checking how well
the model predicts contract assignment by the auction out of sample, we performed a Monte
Carlo exercise where we randomly drew 75% of the observations, fit Model 1, and then predicted
the contract assignments in the remaining observations. Averaging over multiple draws, 63% of
the predictions are correct. Overall, the model does a reasonable job of replicating the contract
assignment that occurred in the Auction treatment.
For the six questions relating to fairness and trust, we made an error in the coding when
subjects chose not to answer.15 This caused 6% of the subjects to be flipped between contracts (6
in the Sort treatment and 10 in the Reverse Sort treatment). The regressions reported in Table 6
(Model 3 and 4) include controls for the sorting mistakes. The sorting mistakes have little impact
on the results since affected subjects tend to be close to the cutoff between contracts.
3.5 Hypotheses: In the Random Assignment treatment, differences in effort between Con-
tracts 1 and 2 reflect only the direct incentive effect. The Sort treatment adds in the selection
effect and the Auction treatment adds in selection and strategic anticipation effects (as defined
previously). All three effects should have a positive effect in Contract 2 relative to Contract 1,
leading to higher effort under Contract 2 than Contract 1.
H1: Average effort in Block 2 will be higher for Contract 2 than Contract 1 in the Random
Assignment, Sort, and Auction treatments.
Along similar lines, effort under Contract 2 should be increasing from Random Assignment
to Sort to Auction. The Reverse Sort treatment is different since the selection effect is reversed.
Given that pessimists tend to get Contract 1 rather than Contract 2 in the Auction treatment, the
assignment process in the Reverse Sort treatment should tend to assign pessimists to Contract 2
rather than Contract 1. Instead of getting the direct incentive effect plus the selection effect, as in
the Sort treatment, effort in the Reverse Sort treatment is affected by the direct incentive effect
minus the selection effect. This implies that effort under Contract 2 should decrease between the
Random Assignment and Reverse Sort treatments.
H2: Average effort in Block 2 for Contract 2 will be increasing in the following order across
15All six questions used a Likert scale over how much subjects disagreed or agreed with a statement. They also
had an option labeled “prefer not to answer.” Averaging across the six questions, 2.2% of the subjects responded
“prefer not to answer.” These responses should have been coded as neutral responses, but instead were coded as
strong disagreement due to our error. The error was only noticed after the fact.
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treatments: Reverse Sort, Random Assignment, Sort, and Auction.
Our predictions about differences between treatments under Contract 1 are a flipped version of
our hypotheses for Contract 2, given that the direct incentive effect, selection effect, and strategic
anticipation effect are all expected to reduce effort under Contract 1.
H3: Average effort in Block 2 for Contract 1 will be decreasing in the following order across
treatments: Reverse Sort, Random Assignment, Sort, and Auction.
H1, H2, and H3 are all ordinal in nature. We have no ex ante hypotheses about the size of
the treatment effects as they depend on the fraction of optimists, pessimists, and individuals with
strategic anticipation in the population. These are purely empirical matters.
Likewise, H2 and H3 jointly imply that the difference between Contracts 1 and 2 in Block 2
should be smaller in the Reverse Sort treatment than in the Random Assignment treatment. The
selection effect may be sufficiently strong that the difference will flip, with Contract 1 yielding
higher effort than Contract 2, but we have no reason to formally hypothesize this outcome in the
absence of data or a firm theoretical basis for our conjecture.
4 Results
Our discussion of the experimental results focuses on individual effort as a measure of performance.
Individual effort directly measures subjects’ choices (unlike payoffs) and has the advantage of
using all subjects’ choices, making it less susceptible than minimum effort to a single outlier
within a group. We also discuss other performance measures such as group minimum effort, waste
(individual effort – minimum effort), and payoffs.
At various points as we introduce the main results, we refer to the significance of various
treatment effects. Unless we state otherwise, the tests being reported are Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-rank tests and the reported results are p-values. An observation is the average value
of individual effort (unless another variable is indicated) for a session in Block 2. Sessions are
matched by the session size and base wage for Contract 2.16 These are conservative tests, which
correct for potential session effects in the most extreme way possible. As such, we are more likely
to make Type II errors (false negatives) than Type I errors (false positives). Later in the results
16Recall that sessions in the Random Assignment, Sort, and Reverse Sort treatments are matched to sessions in
the Auction treatment, using the same session size and base wage for Contract 2.
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section we present Tobit models that explore difference methods of correcting for session effects.
All groups play Block 1 using Contract 1. The goal is to establish a history of low effort that
must be overcome in Block 2. We largely achieve this goal as 73% of groups have minimum effort
of 0 in Round 10 and 61% of individuals choose an effort level of 0. Subjects are randomly assigned
to treatments, and there are no significant differences between treatments in Block 1.17
In Block 2, subjects are assigned to either Contract 1 or Contract 2 in the Random Assignment,
Auction, Sort, and Reverse Sort treatments. Table 5 gives information about individual effort and
a number of alternative performance measures in Block 2. Data are broken down by treatment.
Within each treatment, data are provided by contract (“Contract 1” and “Contract 2”) as well as
the average across both of the contracts (“Both Contracts”).
Table 5: Summary of Block 2 Outcomes
Individual Minimum Variable Total
Effort Effort Waste Payoff Payoff
Random, Contract 1 21.17 16.63 4.55 −6.11 293.89
Random, Contract 2 31.34 27.56 3.78 118.91 326.09
Random, Both Contracts 26.26 22.09 4.16 56.40 309.99
Auction, Contract 1 9.64 3.69 5.95 −26.08 273.92
Auction, Contract 2 39.81 39.25 0.56 193.44 400.63
Auction, Both Contracts 24.73 21.47 3.26 83.68 337.27
Sort, Contract 1 13.45 9.88 3.58 −8.02 291.98
Sort, Contract 2 37.48 35.69 1.80 169.45 376.64
Sort, Both Contracts 25.47 22.78 2.69 80.72 334.31
Reverse, Contract 1 30.03 26.00 4.03 5.84 305.84
Reverse, Contract 2 16.06 10.94 5.13 29.06 236.25
Reverse, Both Contracts 23.05 18.47 4.58 17.45 271.05
Notes: Each observation is the Block 2 average for a group. “Waste” is defined as the difference between individual
effort and minimum effort. “Variable Payoff” does not include fixed wages (W ) while “Total Payoff” is the sum of
fixed wages and variable payoffs.
Figure 1 compares average effort in Block 2 for the Random Assignment, Auction, and Sort
treatments, broken down by contract. Data from the final round of Block 1 (Round 10) are
included to give a better sense of how the incentive contracts change behavior.
17This is based on Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. There is a single observation per group giving the group’s average
effort across Rounds 1 – 10.
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Groups assigned to Contract 2 perform better than those assigned to Contract 1 in all three
treatments. This difference is weakly significant (p = .075) for the Random Assignment treatment
and significant for the Auction (p = .028) and Sort (p = .028) treatments. The data support H1.
Figure 1: Comparison of Random Assignment, Auction and Sort Treatments in Block 2
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Individual effort increases sharply with endogenous assignment to incentive contracts in the
Auction treatment. Groups assigned to Contract 2 in the Auction treatment achieve nearly perfect
coordination at the efficient equilibrium, with all four group members choosing effort level 40 in
96% of the observations (compared with 54% in the Random Assignment treatment). On the flip
side, groups assigned to Contract 1 in the Auction treatment perform poorly with a minimum effort
of 0 in 87% of the observations (versus 57% in the Random Assignment treatment). Comparing
the Auction and Random Assignment treatments, the difference in effort is significant under both
Contract 1 (p = .028) and Contract 2 (p = .035).
The Sort treatment attempts to replicate the selection process of the Auction treatment while
eliminating effects due to strategic anticipation. Even though this replication is obviously imper-
fect, the effect of the Sort treatment is similar to the effect of the Auction treatment. The efficient
equilibrium is played in 78% of the observations for Contract 2, and there is a decline in average
effort for Contract 1 relative to the Random Assignment treatment, albeit not as large as in the
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Auction treatment. This does not reflect a big increase in groups with a minimum effort of 0 (61%
vs. 57% in Random Assignment) but instead shows up as a large decrease in efficient coordination
(16% vs. 40%). Comparing the Sort and Random Assignment treatments, the difference in effort
is weakly significantly under Contract 2 (p = .093) but not Contract 1 (p = .249).18
The Reverse Sort treatment is intended to drive home the power of selection. We intentionally
create a situation that presumably never occurs in field settings, assigning subjects who would
most likely have been assigned to Contract 1 in the Auction treatment to Contract 2 and vice
versa. The selection effect now works in the opposite direction of the direct incentive effect. If
the selection effect is sufficiently strong, the Reverse Sort treatment should yield lower effort in
Contract 2 than Contract 1.
Figure 2: Comparison of Reverse Sort
and Random Assignment Treatments in Block 2
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Figure 2 compares effort levels for the Random Assignment and Reverse Sort treatments.
Colored arrows point from Contract 1 to Contract 2 to make it easier to see the difference between
the two incentive contracts by treatment. In Random Assignment, where only the direct incentive
18As an alternative approach, we have run Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests using the difference between
Block 2 average effort and Block 1 effort (by session). This has relatively little effect on the results with one
exception. Comparing the Sort and Random Assignment treatments, the difference is significant for Contract 1
but not Contract 2, rather than the other way around.
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effect is present, effort is higher under Contract 2 than Contract 1. This is reversed in the Reverse
Sort treatment. The selection effect is sufficiently strong to make effort higher under Contract 1 in
spite of lower incentives to coordinate. This difference between contracts is significant (p = .028).
Across Block 2, efficient coordination occurs in 54% of the observations under Contract 1 as
opposed to only 18% for Contract 2. Likewise, the group’s minimum effort is 0 in 61% of the
observations under Contract 2 versus only 28% for Contract 1. Comparing the Reverse Sort
and Random Assignment treatments, the difference in effort levels is significant for Contract 2
(p = .028) but not Contract 1 (p = .249).
H2 hypothesizes that average effort in Block 2 under Contract 2 would increase in the follow-
ing order across treatments: Reverse Sort, Random Assignment, Sort, and Auction. The data
largely support this hypothesis, with the exception that the difference between the Sort and Auc-
tion treatments is not significant (p = .173). H3 flips the predictions of H2 for Contract 1, with
average effort predicted to decline across treatments in the following order: Reverse Sort, Ran-
dom Assignment, Sort, and Auction. The differences between treatments all have the predicted
signs, but fewer of the differences are statistically significant than for Contract 2 (albeit using a
conservative statistical test).19
Comparing the performance under Contracts 1 and 2 in the Auction treatment illustrates an
important point for interpreting our results. If we look solely at groups assigned to Contract
2, then endogenous assignment to contracts has a strong positive effect. Looking at all of the
groups paints a different picture, as the positive effect for groups assigned to Contract 2 is almost
perfectly offset by the negative effect for groups assigned to Contract 1. Averaging across both
contracts, the average effort in Block 2 is almost identical in the Random Assignment and Auction
treatments (26.26 vs. 24.73), and the difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.600). To
appreciate the effect of endogenous assignment to incentive contracts, we have to understand
the effect for groups that choose high performance pay as well as the effect for groups that do
not. More generally, average individual effort across both contracts is roughly the same for all
four treatments (25.47 and 23.05 for the Sort and Reverse Sort treatments, respectively). Not
surprisingly, none of the differences between treatments are significant when we average across
contracts (comparing the Sort and Reverse Sort treatments with Random Assignment, we get
19For differences between consecutive treatments, statistical significance for all pairs under Contract 1 are re-
ported above except for the difference between the Sort and Auction treatments which is not significant (p = .600).
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p = .600 and p = .463, respectively).
Conclusion 1. Endogenous assignment to contracts increases effort under high performance pay
(Contract 2) and decreases effort under low performance pay (Contract 1). The Sort treatment
generates similar effects as the Auction treatment, albeit weaker under both contracts, while the
Reverse Sort treatment flips the difference between high and low performance pay. Increased effort
under high performance pay (Contract 2) is largely offset by reduced effort under low performance
pay (Contract 1), making individual effort, averaging across both contracts, roughly the same in
all four treatments.
Thus far we have focused on individual effort, but Table 5 provides data on a number of mea-
sures other than individual effort. For the most part, the pattern across treatments is similar to
what we have described for individual effort. This is unsurprising as minimum effort, variable
payoffs, and total payoffs are strongly correlated with individual effort. Waste, defined as the
difference between individual effort and minimum effort, has somewhat different treatment effects
than the other variables. Waste decreases for Contract 2 in the Auction treatment relative to
Random Assignment, reflecting the tendency of all group members to choose effort level 40. This
difference is weakly significant (p = .092). A similar effect is observed for the Sort treatment; the
effect is smaller but statistically significant (p = .046). There is no significant difference in waste
between the Random Assignment and Reverse Sort treatments under Contract 2 (p = .600), and
waste is similar (and not significantly different) across all four treatments under Contract 1 (com-
paring the Auction, Sort, and Reverse Sort treatments with the Random Assignment treatment
yields p = .600, p = .917, and p = .917, respectively). To summarize, endogenous assignment
to contracts reduces waste, but only under Contract 2. The Sort treatment replicates this ef-
fect. Coupled with increased effort, decreased waste reinforces the positive effect of endogenous
assignment to high performance pay.
In addition to the non-parametric tests, we also use Tobit models to examine the statistical
significance of differences between treatments. This analysis, reported in Table 6, serves two
purposes. First, the non-parametric tests take a conservative approach to correcting for the
session effects in the data. The Tobit analysis gives a sense of how robust our conclusions are to
using different approaches to correct for session effects. Second, the non-parametric tests do not
control for several factors that might affect the results. Models 3 and 4 include controls for the
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sorting errors described in Section 3.4. We also control for the average starting effort level of all
subjects in a session. Using the terminology of Fre´chette (2012), this is a direct control for the
most obvious source of dynamic session effects.
Table 6: Tobit Analysis of Treatment Effects
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dependant Variable Group Average Effort in Block 2
Correction for Session Effect Clustering Random Effects Clustering Random Effects
Contract 2 9.638 9.630∗∗ 9.695 9.683∗∗
(6.734) (4.716) (6.704) (4.495)
Contract 1 × Auction −13.102∗∗ −13.132∗∗∗ −12.037∗ −12.145∗∗
(6.275) (4.913) (6.808) (5.008)
Contract 2 × Auction 19.753∗∗∗ 19.611∗∗∗ 20.260∗∗∗ 19.974∗∗∗
(4.436) (5.800) (4.921) (5.794)
Contract 1 × Sort −9.290 −9.369∗ −11.082∗ −11.315∗∗
(6.278) (4.915) (6.670) (4.961)
Contract 2 × Sort 8.534∗ 8.442∗ 10.354∗∗ 10.125∗∗
(4.474) (5.052) (5.037) (5.109)
Contract 1 × Reverse Sort 8.805 8.815∗ 12.153 12.006∗∗
(7.000) (4.967) (7.714) (5.393)
Contract 2 × Reverse Sort −15.644∗∗∗ −15.636∗∗∗ −18.283∗∗∗ −18.487∗∗∗
(4.995) (4.917) (5.940) (5.369)
# of Mistaken Assignments to −6.413∗ −6.188
Contract 2 in Sort / Contract 1 in Reverse Sort (3.354) (4.575)
# of Mistaken Assignments to 12.722∗∗ 13.152∗∗
Contract 1 in Sort / Contract 2 in Reverse Sort (5.771) (5.304)
Round 1 Effort by Other Group Members 0.377 0.366
(0.656) (0.554)
Other Differences Between Treatments
Contract 1×Auction - Contract 1×Sort −3.813 −3.763 −0.955 −0.829
(2.682) (4.861) (3.094) (4.924)
Contract 2×Auction - Contract 2×Sort 11.219∗∗∗ 11.169∗ 9.906∗∗∗ 9.849∗
(3.348) (5.872) (3.728) (5.832)
Contract 2×Reverse Sort - Contract 1×Reverse Sort −14.811∗∗∗ −14.821∗∗∗ −20.740∗∗∗ −20.810∗∗∗
(2.584) (4.704) (1.989) (4.978)
# of Observations 128 128 128 128
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses. Three (***), two (**), and one (*) stars indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The omitted category is the Random Assignment treatment
under Contract 1
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Effort choices from the same group are highly correlated across individuals and rounds, so we
use a group’s average individual effort across all 10 rounds in Block 2 as the dependent variable (a
total of 128 observations). A Tobit model is used to correct for censoring since almost a quarter
of the groups coordinate at the efficient equilibrium (all four subjects choose 40) in all ten rounds
of Block 2.20
We report models using two different methods of correcting for session effects. Models 1 and 3
correct the standard errors for clustering at the session level while Models 2 and 4 include a session-
level random effect. Both approaches assume that there is correlation between observations from
different groups in the same session. The correction for clustering is agnostic about the specific
form of that correlation (and generally relies on weaker assumptions about the error structure),
while the random effects model imposes a specific functional form on session effects (session effects
are constants drawn from a normal distribution). Clustering is generally a more conservative
approach than using random effects. Rather than stating that one is the right approach, our goal
is to get a sense of how much the choice of approach matters.
Turning to the explanatory variables, the omitted category is the Random Assignment treat-
ment under Contract 1. The Contract 2 dummy captures the difference between Contracts 1 and 2
for the Random Assignment treatment. Interactions between a Contract 1 dummy and treatment
dummies (Contract 1 × Auction, Contract 1 × Sort, and Contract 1 × Reverse Sort) capture
treatment effects for Contract 1 using the Random Assignment treatment under Contract 1 as
the base. Likewise, interactions between a Contract 2 dummy and treatment dummies (Contract
2 × Auction, Contract 2 × Sort, and Contract 2 × Reverse Sort) capture treatment effects for
Contract 2 using the Random Assignment treatment under Contract 2 as the base. The top panel
of Table 6 reports parameter estimates and the bottom reports additional estimated differences
between treatments.21
Models 1 and 2 test for treatment effects with no additional controls. The results largely
support our conclusions based on the non-parametric tests. Regardless of whether clustering or
random effects are used to correct for session effects, the Auction treatment has a significant
effect on effort under either Contract 1 or Contract 2. The Sort and Reverse Sort treatments
20There are no groups that had all individuals choose 0 in all ten rounds, so we only have right censoring.
21These differences and the associated standard errors are generated by changing the omitted category and
rerunning the regressions.
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have a significant effect on effort under Contract 2 relative to the Random Assignment treatment
(weakly significant in the case of the Sort treatment). There are two noteworthy differences
between the regression results and the results of the non-parametric tests. First, the difference
between Contracts 1 and 2 in the Random Assignment treatment is not significant (p = .155) when
clustering is used to correct for the session effects. Second, the difference between the Auction and
Sort treatments is significant under Contract 2 in both Models 1 and 2, unlike the non-parametric
test (p = .173).
Due to a mistake in coding missing values (see Section 3.4), a small number of subjects were
accidentally assigned to the wrong contract in the Sort and Reverse Sort treatments. To control
for these sorting errors, Models 3 and 4 include a variable for the number of group members
accidentally assigned to Contract 2 (Contract 1) in the Sort (Reverse Sort) treatment as well as
a variable for the number of group members accidentally assigned to Contract 1 (Contract 2) in
the Sort (Reverse Sort) treatment. The parameter estimates for the two new variables in Model
2 have the expected signs and are jointly significant at the 5% level in both models (p = .040 and
p = .016, respectively).22 Subjects in different groups for Block 2 may have interacted in Block
1, creating links between different Block 2 groups in the same session. Models 3 and 4 control for
the resulting session effects by including the average Round 1 effort, by session, as a new variable.
This control has the expected positive sign but is not significant and has little impact on our
conclusions.
Comparing Models 3 and 4 with Models 1 and 2, the estimated parameters and their signifi-
cance do not differ much. The only difference worth noting is that the effect of the Sort treatment
under Contract 1 is now weakly significant in Model 3, the model using clustering to correct for
session effects.
Overall, the results of the Tobit analysis do not change our conclusions much from the simple
non-parametric tests. Support for H1 is weaker while support for H2 and H3 is stronger, but the
overall picture remains much the same. Neither the use of different methods to account for session
effect nor the inclusion of additional controls affect our main findings as stated in Conclusion 1.
22To understand the expected signs, consider a subject who should be assigned to Contract 1 but is accidentally
assigned to Contract 2 in the Sort treatment. This subject should tend to choose low effort levels in Block 2,
pulling down effort for his/her entire group. This implies that the expected sign for “# of Mistaken Assignments
to Contract 2 in Sort / Contract 1 in Reverse Sort” is negative. The same logic implies a positive sign for the other
control variable.
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In Section 3.2, we attribute the total effect of high performance pay in the Auction treatment to
three effects: the direct incentive effect, the selection effect, and the effect of strategic anticipation.
The direct incentive effect is measured by the difference between average individual effort (shown
in Table 5) under Contracts 1 and 2 in the Random Assignment treatment (31.3 – 21.2). The
sum of the selection and strategic anticipation effects is measured by the difference between the
Auction and Random Assignment treatments under Contract 2 (39.8 – 31.3) while the difference
between the Sort and Random Assignment treatments (37.5 – 31.3) provides a lower bound on
the selection effect. The ratio of the two preceding differences (73%) provides a lower bound on
the proportion of the increased effect of high performance pay with endogenous assignment to
contracts that can be attributed to selection.23 The specific point estimate of 73% is not terribly
important. It is only a lower bound and is based on behavior by a specific set of subject in a
specific environment. The point is that selection has a powerful effect in our experiments, more
so than strategic anticipation.24
The power of selection can also be seen in Figure 3. Recall that subjects in the Sort (Reverse
Sort) treatment were placed into groups according to predicted dropout time. Within a contract,
the groups only differed in how strongly we predicted that they would have gotten the same
contract (the other contract) in the Auction treatment. Any differences between these groups
were purely due to selection. Figure 3 reports Block 2 data from groups that were on the border
between the two contracts and groups that were at the extremes (i.e. most likely to be assigned to
Contract 1 or Contract 2).25 There are separate panels for the Sort and Reverse Sort treatments.
Groups assigned to Contract 1 are shown in red and groups assigned to Contract 2 are shown
23The difference between this ratio and 50% is weakly significant (p = .086).
24In a companion paper (Cooper, Ioannou, and Qi, 2018), we develop a structural model of learning and fit
it to the experimental data. We then use the model to examine what the selection effect would look like if the
Sort treatment perfectly replicated the assignment to incentive contracts from the Auction treatment. We estimate
that the true proportion of the improvement with endogenous assignment to high performance pay that can be
attributed to selection is 90%.
25 Each treatment had four sessions with 24 subjects and two sessions with 16 subjects. In a 24-subject session
of the Sort treatment, the groups range from Group 1, consisting of the individuals predicted with the highest
probability to be assigned to Contract 2 by the auction, to Group 6 which contains the individuals predicted to
have the lowest probability of assignment to Contract 2 by the auction. Groups 1, 2, 3 are assigned to Contract 2
and Groups 4, 5, 6 are assigned to Contract 1. Groups 1 and 6 are defined to be the extreme groups, the groups
predicted to be most likely to be assigned to their respective contracts. Groups 3 and 4 are defined to be the
border groups, the groups least likely to be assigned to their respective contracts. Similarly, in a 16-subject session
of the Sort treatment, Groups 1 and 4 are the extreme groups, and Groups 2 and 3 are the border groups. Border
and extreme groups are defined in an analogous fashion for the Reverse Sort treatment. There is one border group
and one extreme group per contract in each session.
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in blue. For the Reverse Sort treatment, recall that groups assigned to Contract 1 consisted of
individuals predicted to be assigned to Contract 2 in the Auction treatment, and vice versa for
Contract 2. Border groups are shown with solid markers and extreme groups with hollow markers.
For both contracts in both treatments, the extreme groups differ from the border groups. For
groups predicted to be assigned to Contract 1 (Contract 1 in Sort and Contract 2 in Reverse
Sort), average effort is lower in Block 2 for the extreme groups. This flips for groups predicted
to be assigned to Contract 2 (Contract 2 in Sort and Contract 1 in Reverse Sort). The difference
between border and extreme groups is significant for groups predicted to be assigned to Contract
1 (p = .010) and groups predicted to be assigned to Contract 2 (p = .003). The power of selection
can be seen along a number of other dimensions. In groups predicted to be assigned to Contract
2, the frequency of efficient coordination (all group members pick 40) rises from 51% for border
groups to 84% for extreme groups. Likewise, in groups predicted to be assigned to Contract 1, the
likelihood that the group’s minimum effort equals 0 rises from 39% for border groups to 90% for
extreme groups. This illustrates how powerful selection can be in isolation, and shows that our
attempt to sort subjects into groups picks up something relevant for how the game was played.
Conclusion 2. A number of features in our data point to the importance of selection. Comparing
the effects of the Sort and Auction treatments suggests that the selection effect is stronger than the
effect of strategic anticipation. The effect of selection is so strong that it can overcome the direct
effect of lower incentives to yield coordination at high effort levels in the Reverse Sort treatment.
In the Sort and Reverse Sort treatments, extreme groups (most likely to be selected into contracts)
behave significantly differently than border groups, illustrating the power of selection.
To understand why selection is so powerful, recall from Table 4 that Round 1 choices, partic-
ularly choice of 40, are by far the best predictor of dropout times. The tendency of the auction to
assign subjects who chose 40 in Round 1 to Contract 2 is important because those subjects were
extremely likely to also choose 40 in Round 11 regardless of their circumstances.
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Figure 3: Comparison of Border and Extreme Groups in Block 2
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Figure 4 illustrates this point. The data for this figure come from all subjects who chose 40
in Round 1. The left hand panel displays the distribution of their choices in Round 11, broken
down by the contract they were assigned in Block 2. For either contract, subjects who chose effort
level 40 in Round 1 almost always chose 40 in Round 11. This is not because they failed to learn
across Block 1. Most groups had low minimum efforts by the end of Block 1, and even the subset
of initially optimistic subjects learned to adjust their choices during the course of Block 1. Only
36% chose 40 in Round 10, and only 10% chose something other than 0 in Round 10 if they were
in a group with a minimum effort of 0. Rather, these subjects returned to their initial optimism
when the game restarted with a new group and, possibly, a new contract. The right hand panel
demonstrates how general this phenomenon was. It reports average effort in Round 11 broken
down by treatment and contract. In all cases the average is close to 40.
Figure 4: Round 11 Behavior by Subjects Choosing 40 in Round 1
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Subjects who chose 40 in Round 1 were far more likely to choose 40 in Round 11 than other
subjects (85% vs. 39% in Contract 1 and 90% vs. 56% in Contract 2).26 Initial optimism is not
26Based on Probit regressions, we find that the likelihood of choosing 40 in Round 11 does not vary significantly
across choices 0 – 30 in Round 1, but jumps significantly if 40 was chosen in Round 1.
34
transient but instead seems to represent a subject’s type. The auction tends to assign subjects
who chose 40 in Round 1 to Contract 2, leaving others behind in Contract 1. The Sort treatment
shares a tendency to assign subjects who chose 40 in Round 1 to Contract 2 and therefore yields
similar outcomes to the Auction treatment.
5 Conclusion
The primary purpose of this paper was to investigate how endogenous assignment to incentive
contracts affects the efficacy of high performance pay as a tool for escaping a productivity trap.
The impact on groups that receive such performance pay is much greater when assignment is en-
dogenous, with groups achieving almost perfect coordination at the efficient equilibrium. However,
at a global level, this is entirely offset by the negative impact on groups that keep the original
incentive contract with low performance pay. Our design makes it possible to identify a lower
bound on how much of the increased effect of high performance pay with endogenous contract as-
signment is due to selection rather than strategic anticipation. We find that selection accounts for
substantially more of the increase than strategic anticipation, even though the impact of selection
is presumably underestimated due to the Sort treatment’s imperfect replication of the selection
process in the Auction treatment. The effect of selection is sufficiently strong that it can over-
come the direct effect of incentives, as manipulating the assignment process in the Reverse Sort
treatment generates higher productivity with low performance pay.
While a number of studies have found that selection accounts for a high proportion of the
effect of performance pay, the flavor of our results is rather different. In the existing literature,
selection has an effect by choosing people who are good at performing some task – solving puzzles,
multiplying numbers, etc. In our experiment, selection chooses people who are optimistic about
coordinating at efficient outcomes (or believe that others are optimistic). Selection is primarily
based on beliefs rather than abilities.
Our finding that high performance pay increases productivity by matching optimists with
each other is related to Becker’s work (1973) on the marriage problem and Kremer’s work (1993)
on the assignment of workers to firms. Becker considers the allocation of men and women into
marriages in which the “productivity” of each marriage is assumed to depend on the ability levels
of each of the partners. Becker then provides conditions under which the efficient allocation of
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partners results in assortative matching.27 Similarly, when the productivity of each worker in an
organization depends positively on the productivity of co-workers, incentives exist for relatively
high-skilled workers to form firms that exclude their lower-skilled counterparts (Kremer, 1993).
A surprising finding from our experiments is the minuscule total effect, averaging over both
contracts, of endogenous assignment to incentive contracts. The underlying issue is that assigning
more optimists to Contract 2 necessarily means assigning more pessimists to Contract 1. This
implies that labor mobility plays a central role in determining the total effect of endogenous
assignment to incentive contracts. In future work we hope to explore the implications of making
labor markets open versus closed, in the sense defined previously, as well as allowing firms to
choose an incentive contract rather than exogenously assigning incentive contracts to firms.
Our experiments take advantage of the control available in the laboratory. The insights we
could draw from our data would be limited without our Sort and Reverse Sort treatments, but
it is hard to imagine a real-world setting that would mimic these treatments. A natural question
is how our results apply to labor markets in the field. Real labor markets are far more complex
than our lab experiments. In the simple environment of our experiments, the data suggest that
workers generally do not take into account the implications of endogenous assignment to incentive
contracts and the resulting effects of selection. What are the odds that workers in more complex
field settings understand these subtle issues? This implies that strategic anticipation plays an
even smaller role in field settings than in the lab, a conjecture that we hope to verify in the future.
More generally, we hope that future research will establish a relationship in field settings
between selection for optimists and organizational success. For example, there has been movement
towards “agile” software development over the past two decades. Many specific processes for
software development (e.g. Extreme Programming, Scrum, etc.) fall under the umbrella of agile
software development. There are a number of common features associated with agile software
development, but of particular interest to us is a focus on small self-organizing teams. These
provide a very different work environment from more traditional top-down organizations and there
exists evidence that these different organizational forms attract software developers with different
personality traits (e.g. Yilmaz, O’Connor, Colomo-Palacios, and Clarke, 2017, employing the
27Specifically, Becker (1973) shows that in a transferable utility matching market, if there are complementarities in
production, then any core allocation, and consequently, any competitive equilibrium, exhibits assortative matching.
In other words, individuals sort themselves into matches with likely mates such that the ablest male is matched
with the ablest female.
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Big Five, find that extroversion is more prevalent among members of agile software development
teams). It would be interesting to know whether, as our research suggests, there is selection
based on beliefs about the likelihood of cooperation and/or efficient coordination within teams
and whether this type of selection plays an important role in organizational success. We view this
and similar issues as promising directions for future work.
Finding field evidence for negative effects due to selection is also of interest to us. The literature
on entrepreneurship provides an interesting example of this. Less than 10% of new businesses are
started by teams of non-relatives rather than individuals or relatives (Shane, 2008), but firms
founded by teams tend to do better. This can be attributed in part to preferences for working
alone rather than in a team and/or pessimism about the profitability of teams. Specifically,
Cooper and Saral (2013) find that entrepreneurs are significantly less willing to join teams than
otherwise similar business people. In other words, entrepreneurship tends to attract individuals
whose preferences and beliefs make them less likely to succeed as entrepreneurs!28
Our paper and much of the related literature stresses workers’ choices of jobs as a source of
selection, but firms can and do actively use applicants’ characteristics when choosing who to hire.
Personality testing, particularly use of the Big Five, became popular starting in the late 1980
and early 1990s. One recent study finds that about 20% of large firms use personality testing
(Piotrowski and Armstrong, 2006). To the extent that they correctly identify the characteristics
associated with success, this practice should have a positive effect like the Sort treatment. It re-
mains controversial whether or not personality testing is useful for employers. While some argue
that that personality tests are good predictors of “soft skills” like persistence and willingness to
follow organizational norms (Barrick and Mount, 2012), others claim that the usefulness of per-
sonality testing is limited, partially because job candidates have a strong incentive to manipulate
the test results (Stabile, 2001).29 It remains to be seen if some form of behavioral testing including
instruments more familiar to experimental economists will prove useful to firms when hiring new
employees.30
28Cooper and Saral’s experiment is designed to limit the possibility that beliefs can explain the relative disinterest
of entrepreneurs in joining teams, stressing the role of preferences. We think it is likely that beliefs also play an
important role, a conjecture that we hope to explore in the future.
29For other papers discussing the usefulness of personality testing, see Morgeson, Campion, Dipboye, Hollenbeck,
Murphy, and Schmitt, 2007; Ones, Dilchert, Viswesvaran, and Judge, 2007.
30Unilever is an example of a firm using personality tests that mirror standard experimental tasks like the trust
game and the balloon analogue risk task (Feloni, 2017).
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